Abstract
In this paper; having somewhat arbitrarily adopted a general line of interpretation of Wittgenstein on forms of life in which the word ’life' is taken in a biological sense, I try to work out ways of being more specific than that, which (a) are philosophically interesting, (b) are consistent with Wittgenstein's uses of the expression form of life' and with other remarks of his that seem closely connected, and (c) that take seriously both his disavowal of THESES in philosophy and his (related) belief that the job of philosophy is not to devise better theories, but to show how the problem itself arises from a particular kind of misunderstanding of language. A number of ways in which the idea of a form of life could play that sort of part are explored, for example the question how we know from which direction a sound comes, which we might initially have supposed to be answerable by reference to a calculation of the time difference in the arrival of a sound wave at one ear and then the other is rejected in favour of a supposition that the waves affect the nervous system and thereby causes us to look in the correct direction. This is an important difference. A neurologist might spend half a lifetime tracking down the nerves that calculate the direction, ana fail because no such calculation is done. Misdirected questions about identifying and locating pains, and about mastery are investigated, and finally Wittgenstein is depicted as holding that the nervous system, together with membership in a community provides all the assurance we need of the general correctness of calculations.