Is Zhuangzi a Wanton? Observation and Transformation of Desires in the Zhuangzi

Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 19 (2):289-305 (2020)
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Abstract

This essay considers how the Zhuangzi 莊子 sheds light on a new direction to the contemporary discussion of desires. Harry Frankfurt proposes an account of personhood based on a hierarchy of desires. He defines a wanton as a being that does not have second-order volitions, the desires that a certain desire of action becomes her will. J. David Velleman proposes, in the context of the Zhuangzi, that when a Daoist sage performs her skills she can be regarded as a “higher” wanton because her actions are spontaneous flows of skillful actions. In this essay, I propose along the line of Velleman a constructive interpretation of the Zhuangzian way to deal with desires from my reading of the Zhuangzi. I argue that there are two roles a Daoist sage can play: the observer and the performer. A Daoist sage can be an observer at a certain time and a performer at other times. Although a performer can be regarded as a higher wanton, it is inappropriate to regard an observer as a wanton. Also, I propose that observation is a means to transform desires—once the practitioner achieves high spirituality, one does not need to possess second-order volitions because one’s first-order desires are transformed such that they are in accordance with the Dao 道.

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Jenny Hung
The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

Citations of this work

On being “without-desire” in Lao-Zhuang Daoism.Jacob Bender - 2023 - Asian Philosophy 33 (4):331-346.

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References found in this work

Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1971 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.
"The Tenuous Self: Wu-wei in the Zhuangzi.Edward Gilman Slingerland - 2003 - In Effortless action : Wu-wei as conceptual metaphor and spiritual ideal in early China. New York:
The Complete Works of Chuang-tzu.Richard B. Mather, Burton Watson & Chuang-tzu - 1972 - Journal of the American Oriental Society 92 (2):334.
The Way of the Wanton.J. David Velleman - 2008 - In Catriona Mackenzie & Kim Atkins (eds.), Practical Identity and Narrative Agency. Routledge.

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