Demonstrative belief and dispositions

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forthcoming in Journal of Philosophical Research. This paper argues against David Armstrong’s view that singular beliefs are not dispositions. It also begins to develop the view that self-conscious belief is a matter of belief revision.

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David Hunter
University of Adelaide

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