Smiley's distinction between rules of inference and rules of proof

In Jonathan Lear & Alex Oliver (eds.), The Force of Argument: Essays in Honor of Timothy Smiley. Routledge. pp. 107--126 (2010)
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Lloyd Humberstone
Monash University

Citations of this work

Naive Modus Ponens and Failure of Transitivity.Andreas Fjellstad - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (1):65-72.
Proof Theory for Functional Modal Logic.Shawn Standefer - 2018 - Studia Logica 106 (1):49-84.
A Substructural Approach to Explicit Modal Logic.Shawn Standefer - 2023 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 32 (2):333–362.
Replacement in Logic.Lloyd Humberstone - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):49-89.

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