Privileged Access and the Agent in the Thought-Insertion

Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (3):165-167 (2018)
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Abstract

In his paper, Young has eloquently put forward a novel account of how and why the phenomenon of thought-insertion seen in patients with schizophrenia does not contradict the immunity principle. He argues that, in TI, the problem lies not in misidentification but in mispredication: the individual with TI does not ascribe the right predicate to the wrong subject, but has misdetected the predicate in the first place. The author points out that an inconsistently formulated immunity principle could risk confusing the two types of errors. The author defines the immunity principle as: Any agent...

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10.1353/ppp.2018.0025

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