Domination, the State and Anarchism

In Klaus Mathis & Luca Langensand (eds.), Dignity, Diversity, Anarchy. pp. 143-168 (2021)
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Abstract

Anarchists standardly critique the state for being illegitimate, and for being dominating in some sense. Often these criticisms come as a bundle: the state is illegitimate because it is dominating. But there are various stories we might tell about the connection between the two; domination makes consent impossible, domination means that the state fails to meet its own justification for existing (or for claiming authority), and so on. I suggest that we should sidestep concerns about consent: in part because it seems possible for people to genuinely consent to something which is nonetheless impermissible, but also because many anarchists offer views of political organisation which very clearly involve some coercion of rule-breakers – Malatesta, for example, explicitly endorses the exclusion of persistent non-compliers. Rather, I argue that the best way to understand why the state is illegitimate – and a way which is immanent in many anarchist critiques – is to combine something like a Pettitian analysis of domination with a requirement that genuine authorities (and authoritative imperatives) recognise us as agents and treat us accordingly. On this view, states are necessarily dominating in virtue of two key features: dominating in virtue of being able to exercise arbitrary power over agents, necessarily so because part of what it is to be a state is to be an institution which exercises (and refrains from exercising) power in virtue of morally arbitrary features. As a paradigm case, states must be able to exclude non-citizens, on pain of losing their successful claim to a monopoly on legitimate force. But to recognise somebody as an agent is inconsistent with denying them access to territory or services on the basis of something as arbitrary as their place of birth. This analysis also explains why it’s possible to hold that all states are illegitimate, but some are nonetheless “better” than others – depending on the structure of a state and the power held by its citizens, we may be more or less vulnerable to arbitrary interference, and hence be more or less dominated, in one state than another.

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James Humphries
University of Glasgow

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The Social-Relational View of Recognition Respect.James Humphries - 2021 - Bibliotecca Della Liberta 56 (231):5-30.

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