The Success of Science and Social Norms

History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 23 (3/4):341 - 360 (2001)
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Abstract

In this paper I characterize science in terms of both invisible hand social organization and selection. These two processes are responsible for different features of science. Individuals working in isolation cannot produce much in the way of the warranted knowledge. Individual biases severely limit how much secure knowledge an individual can generate on his or her own. Individuals working in consort are required, but social groups can be organized in many different ways. The key feature of the social organization in science is that only working scientists can confer the most important reward in science — use — and scientists must use each other's work in order to succeed in realizing this goal. An analysis of science as a selection process serves quite a different function. Individual scientists strive to come up with novel solutions to significant problems. The question then becomes how to be creative. From a selective perspective, science as a process involves the production of numerous alternatives and a selection among them. A single scientist solving an important problem makes science look very efficient. Treating science as a selection process casts it in a very different light. In this paper I combine an invisible hand mechanism with a selective perspective in order to explain why science is as successful as it is. I do not make recourse to evolutionary epistemology in any of its traditional senses.

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