Abstract

In this article a distinction is made between causation, or the production of an effect by its cause, and causality, or the relationship between cause and effect. Though Peirce never explicitly made this distinction, he clearly did so implicitly by severely criticizing the principle of causality, and by elaborating a constructive theory of causation. Peirce observed that the concept of ‘cause’ has at least three different and incompatible meanings. He argued, moreover, that the variety and increasing complexity of nature cannot be explained on the basis of the so-called principle of causality. Cause-effect relationships therefore cannot be determined by deterministic laws, but must instead be determined by probabilistic laws. This entails that cause-effect relationships are irreversible and that causes precede their effects in time. Peirce maintained that cause and effect are facts within an epistemological context, while they are events within an ontological context. The relationship between Peircean events and Peircean processes is discussed, and it is argued that Peircean processes differ from Peircean events inasmuch as only the formers are characterized by complexity, teleology, and coherence. Furthermore, it is argued that Peirce’s conception of causation is characterized by a triple interdependence of final causation, efficient causation and chance.