The Philosophy of Fields and Particles in Classical and Quantum Mechanics, Including the Problem of Renormalisation
Dissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick (
1995)
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Abstract
This work first explicates the philosophy of classical and quantum fields and particles. I am interested in determining how science can have a metaphysical dimension, and then with the claim that the quantum revolution has an important metaphysical component. I argue that the metaphysical implications of a theory are properties of its models, as classical mechanics determines properties of atomic diversity and temporal continuity with its representations of distinct, continuous trajectories. ;It is often suggested that classical statistical physics requires that many particle states be represented so that permuting properties leads to distinct states; this implies that individuals can be reidentified across possible worlds in a non-qualitative way. I show there is no evidence for this conclusion, an important result, for it is claimed that quantum particles are not individuals. This claim is based on the misconception about classical statistics, but also on a conflation of notions of identity; I show that, while transworld identity is incompatible with quantum mechanics, other classical notions may be consistently ascribed. I also give a field-particle distinction that applies usefully in both quantum and classical domains. In the former the distinction helps defeat claims of underdetermined by data, in the latter it helps provide a minimal field metaphysics. ;Next I tackle renormalisation: I show how divergences occur in approximate, perturbative calculations, and demonstrate how finite, empirically verified, answers are obtained. These techniques seem to show that the predictions are not logical consequences of the exact theory. I use the techniques of the renormalisation group to establish that perturbative renormalised quantum field theory does indeed approximate the consequences of field theory. ;Finally, I discuss the idea that renormalisation proves that there can be no quantum theory of everything, only a patchwork of effective theories. The preceding chapter shows that renormalisation demonstrates only that the picture is consistent, and this is insufficient to show that physics must be phenomenological