Abstract

This thesis examines the UK’s ability to legitimately apply hard power for the purpose of humanitarian intervention, over the next 10-15 years. It outlines the differences in the potential uses of hard power, with specific reference to the provisions made by the UN Charter, and also to UK Defence publications, which articulate the ‘Military Tasks’ and ‘Strategic Priorities’ within the ‘Strategy for Defence’. It examines the use of hard power in the form of humanitarian intervention, specifically linking legitimacy (with reference to Just War Theory and the UN’s ‘Responsibility to Protect’ concept) to a necessity for post-intervention stabilisation. Having established that intervention and stabilisation must be linked to legitimise a humanitarian intervention, the complexity and cost (in economic and human terms)of intervention with a subsequent period of stabilisation are discussed. Where it might be acknowledged that the true cost of intervention is too steep, other ways of projecting influence are outlined, specifically ideas to effect upstream prevention of the need for humanitarian intervention