Luminosity Failure, Normative Guidance and the Principle ‘Ought-Implies-Can’

Utilitas 30 (4):439-457 (2018)
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Abstract

It is widely thought that moral obligations are necessarily guidance giving. This supposed fact has been put to service in defence of the ‘ought-implies-can’ principle according to which one cannot be morally obligated to do the impossible, since impossible-to-satisfy obligations would not give guidance. It is argued here that the supposed fact is no such thing; moral obligations are not necessarily guiding giving, and so the ‘guidance argument’ for ought-implies-can fails. This is the result of no non-trivial condition being ‘luminous’.

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Nick Hughes
University of Oslo

Citations of this work

Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.
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References found in this work

Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.
Having reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):57 - 71.

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