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The problem of defeasible justification
Erkenntnis 54 (3):375-397 (2001)
Abstract
The problem of induction and the problem of Cartesian/brain-in-the-vat skepticism have much in common. Both are instances of a general problem of defeasible justification . I use the term "defeasible justification" to refer to a relation between a piece of evidence.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Serious theories and skeptical theories: Why you are probably not a brain in a vat.Michael Huemer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1031-1052.
Graded epistemic justification.John Hawthorne & Arturs Https://Orcidorg Logins - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1845-1858.
Problems for Credulism.James Pryor - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 89–131.
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