Moore's Paradox and the Norm of Belief

In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Oxford University Press (2007)
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Michael Huemer
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Citations of this work

Why Double-Check?Elise Woodard - forthcoming - Episteme:1-24.
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Structural Rationality and the Property of Coherence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2023 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (1):170-194.

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