Banishing “I” and “we” from accounts of metacognition

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):148-149 (2009)
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Abstract

Carruthers offers a promising model for how know the propositional contents of own minds. Unfortunately, in retaining talk of first-person access to mental states, his suggestions assume that a higher-order self is already We invite Carruthers to eliminate the first-person from his model and to develop a more thoroughly third-person model of metacognition

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2009-04-24

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Author Profiles

Bryce Huebner
Georgetown University
Daniel C. Dennett
Tufts University

Citations of this work

Genuinely collective emotions.Bryce Huebner - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):89-118.
Does Naturalism Rest on a Mistake.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2011 - American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (2):161-173.
Personhood and first-personal experience.Richard E. Duus - 2017 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 37 (2):109-127.

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References found in this work

Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.
The phenomenal stance.Philip Robbins & Anthony I. Jack - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):59-85.
How language helps us think.Ray Jackendoff - 1996 - Pragmatics and Cognition 4 (1):1-34.

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