The Methodological Strategy of Robustness in the Context of Experimental WIMP Research

Foundations of Physics 39 (2):174-193 (2009)
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Abstract

According to the methodological principle called ‘robustness’, empirical evidence is more reliable when it is generated using multiple, independent (experimental) routes that converge on the same result. As it happens, robustness as a methodological strategy is quite popular amongst philosophers. However, despite its popularity, my goal here is to criticize the value of this principle on historical grounds. My historical reasons take into consideration some recent history of astroparticle physics concerning the search for WIMPs (weakly interacting massive particles), one of the main candidates for cosmic dark matter. On the basis of these reasons, I assert that robustness, at least in this historical case we are considering, has less value than usually assumed by philosophers

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Robert Hudson
University of Saskatchewan

Citations of this work

Variety of evidence in multimessenger astronomy.Shannon Sylvie Abelson - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 94 (C):133-142.
Using Multiple Means of Determination.Jutta Schickore & Klodian Coko - 2013 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (3):295-313.
Two Senses of Experimental Robustness: Result Robustness and Procedure Robustness.Koray Karaca - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (1):279-298.

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References found in this work

Bayesian Epistemology.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2003 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by Stephan Hartmann.
Representing and Intervening.Ian Hacking - 1983 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (4):381-390.
Representing and Intervening.Ian Hacking - 1987 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 92 (2):279-279.

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