On constitution and all-fusions

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):237–245 (2000)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Recently, Judith Jarvis Thomson has offered a definition of the constitution relation against the backdrop of a robust ontology of objects she calls all‐fusions. Despite finding her reasons to believe in all manner of all‐fusions intriguing, in this paper I note an unsatisfactory consequence of her position for constitution‐theorists. I argue that an unrestricted commitmentto all‐fusions should lead the constitution‐theorist to reject her definitionof the constitution relation, on the grounds that by choosing our all‐fusionscarefully, we can secure the unpalatable result that two different all‐fusionsconstitute the same thing, even though neither one ofthem constitutes the other

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
37 (#375,012)

6 months
1 (#1,042,085)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Hud Hudson
Western Washington University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references