Pairwise comparison and numbers skepticism

Utilitas 19 (4):487-504 (2007)
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Abstract

In this article, we defend pairwise comparison as a method to resolve conflicting claims from different people that cannot be jointly satisfied because of a scarcity of resources. We consider Michael Otsuka's recent challenge that pairwise comparison leads to intransitive choices for the (someone who believes the numbers should not count in forced choices among lives) and Frances Kamm's responses to Otsuka's challenge. We argue that Kamm's responses do not succeed, but that the threat they are designed to meet is illusory. Once the method of pairwise comparison is understood in a manner consistent with its proposed use, the challenge disappears. In making this argument, we examine questions about the interpretation of pairwise comparison and maintain that it must be understood as a method for ensuring that decisions are justifiable from the perspective of each affected individual

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References found in this work

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Equality or Priority?Derek Parfit - 2002 - In Matthew Clayton & Andrew Williams (eds.), The Ideal of Equality. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 81-125.
The Possibility of Altruism.John Benson - 1972 - Philosophical Quarterly 22 (86):82-83.

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