Regulative Assumptions, Hinge Propositions and the Peircean Conception of Truth
Erkenntnis 78 (2):451-468 (2013)
Abstract
This paper defends a key aspect of the Peircean conception of truth—the idea that truth is in some sense epistemically-constrained. It does so by exploring parallels between Peirce’s epistemology of inquiry and that of Wittgenstein in On Certainty. The central argument defends a Peircean claim about truth by appeal to a view shared by Peirce and Wittgenstein about the structure of reasons. This view relies on the idea that certain claims have a special epistemic status, or function as what are popularly called ‘hinge propositions’Author's Profile
DOI
10.1007/s10670-011-9351-6
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Citations of this work
Constituting assertion: a pragmatist critique of Horwich’s ‘Truth’.Andrew Howat - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):935-954.
A Pragmatic-Semiotic Defence of Bivalence.Marc Champagne - 2022 - History and Philosophy of Logic 43 (2):143-157.
References found in this work
On Certainty (ed. Anscombe and von Wright).Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1969 - New York and London: Harper Torchbooks.
