On a “Fatal Dilemma” for Moderate Foundationalism

Abstract

Contemporary foundationalists prefer Moderate Foundationalism over Strong Foundationalism. In this paper, we assess two arguments against the former which have been recently defended by Timothy McGrew. Three theses are central to the discussion: that only beliefs can be probabilifying evidence, that justification is internal, in McGrew’s sense of the term, and that only beliefs can be nonarbitrary justifying reasons.

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Daniel Howard-Snyder
Western Washington University
Christian Lee
Western Washington University

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