Forever fitting feelings

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (1):80-98 (2022)
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Abstract

This paper addresses a recent puzzle in the ethics of emotions concerning the fitting duration of emotions. On the one hand, many of our emotions tend to fade with time and can seem to do so fittingly. Think of attitudes like anger, grief, and regret. On the other hand, it's difficult to see how it could be fitting for these feelings to fade since the facts that make them fitting can seem to persist. This is the puzzle in brief; that of explaining how certain feelings can fittingly fade with time. This paper argues that this puzzle has no general solution: in a wide range of true‐to‐life cases our fitting feelings remain fitting forever, until the day that we die. I conclude by exploring the normative significance of this result and its implications for the ethics of attitudes more generally.

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Christopher Howard
McGill University

Citations of this work

Blameworthiness is Terminable.Benjamin Matheson - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
In defense of guilt‐tripping.Rachel Achs - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Dimensions of Emotional Fit.Sam Mason - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.

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References found in this work

Moral dimensions: permissibility, meaning, blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Value and the right kind of reason.Mark Schroeder - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5:25-55.
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.

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