Deduction Difficulties

Kantian Review 23 (1):111-121 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I argue, contrary to Dennis Schulting inKant’s Radical Subjectivism, that the main reasoning of Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories is progressive, not regressive. Schulting is right, however, to emphasize that the deduction takes the object cognized to be constituted in an idealism-entailing way. But his reasoning has gaps and bypasses Kant’s most explicit deduction argument, independent of the Transcendental Aesthetic, for idealism. Finally, Schulting’s claim that Kantian discursivity itself requires idealism overlooks the fact that Kantian general judgements can be true in a domain of objects without being specificallyofor about any particular ones of those objects.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

On Quine's Approach to Natural Deduction'.Carlo Cellucci - 1995 - In Paolo Leonardi & Marco Santambrogio (eds.), On Quine: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. pp. 314--335.
The Two Steps of the B-Deduction.Markku Leppäkoski - 1998 - Kantian Review 2:107-116.
Some difficulties about deduction.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):341-342.
The Proof Structure of Kant's A-Deduction.Michael Barker - 2001 - Kant Studien 92 (3):259-282.
Apperception and Analyticity in the B-Deduction.Henry E. Allison - 1993 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 44 (1):233-252.
Apperception and Analyticity in the B-Deduction.Henry E. Allison - 1993 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 44 (1):233-252.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-02-26

Downloads
32 (#488,786)

6 months
6 (#512,819)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?