Hornsby on the phenomenology of speech

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):131–145 (2005)
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Abstract

The central claim is that the semantic knowledge exercised by people when they speak is practical knowledge. The relevant idea of practical knowledge is explicated, applied to the case of speaking, and connected with an idea of agents’ knowledge. Some defence of the claim is provided.

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Author Profiles

Jennifer Hornsby
Birkbeck College
Jason Stanley
Yale University

Citations of this work

Knowledge-How, Abilities, and Questions.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):86-104.
Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
In defense of hearing meanings.Berit Brogaard - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2967-2983.
Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology.Susanna Schellenberg - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.
Know-How and Concept Possession.Bengson John & Moffett Marc - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (1):31 - 57.

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References found in this work

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
The logical basis of metaphysics.Michael Dummett - 1991 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

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