Evolutionary explanation and the hard problem of consciousness

Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (1):39-48 (1999)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Chalmers and others have argued that physicalist microexplanation is incapable of solving the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness. This article examines whether evolutionary accounts of the mind, such as those developed by Millikan, Dretske and Flanagan, can add anything to make up for the possible short falls of more reductionist accounts. I argue that they cannot, because evolutionary accounts explain by appeal to a selectional history that only comes into the picture if consciousness can first arise due to spontaneous mutation in some individual organism, and explaining this emergence of consciousness from DNA and embryology calls for precisely the kind of structurally-based supervenience account that Chalmers et al. have objected to. Not only does an evolutionary account not succeed where a reductionist account fails; the evolutionary account presupposes the possibility of a reductionist account

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Giving up on the hard problem of consciousness.Eugene Mills - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):26-32.
Facing up to the problem of consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
The evolution of consciousness.Peter Carruthers - 2000 - In Peter Carruthers & A. Chamberlain (eds.), Evolution and the Human Mind: Modularity, Language and Meta-Cognition. Cambridge University Press. pp. 254.
The philosophical issue in machine consciousness.Piotr Boltuc - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (1):155-176.
Explaining the "magic" of consciousness.Daniel C. Dennett - 2003 - Journal of Cultural and Evolutionary Psychology 1 (1):7-19.
What hard problem?Massimo Pigliucci - 2013 - Philosophy Now (99).
The hardness of the hard problem.William S. Robinson - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):14-25.
The character of consciousness.David John Chalmers - 2010 - New York: Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
75 (#201,018)

6 months
2 (#670,035)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Probabilistic causation and the explanatory role of natural selection.Pablo Razeto-Barry & Ramiro Frick - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 42 (3):344-355.
Probabilistic causation and the explanatory role of natural selection.Pablo Razeto-Barry & Ramiro Frick - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 42 (3):344-355.
Naturalisms in philosophy of mind.Steven Horst - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):219-254.
The power of natural selection.Fiona Macpherson - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (8):30-35.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references