European Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):47-67 (2017)
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Abstract |
An enkratic agent is someone who intends to do A because she believes she should do A. Being enkratic is usually understood as something rationality requires of you. However, we must distinguish between different conceptions of enkratic rationality. According to a fairly common view, enkratic rationality is solely a normative requirement on agency: it tells us how agents should think and act. However, I shall argue that this normativist conception of enkratic rationality faces serious difficulties: it makes it a mystery how an agent's thinking and acting can be guided by the enkratic requirement, which, as I shall further argue, is something that an adequate conception of enkratic rationality must be able to explain. This, I suggest, motivates exploring a different account of enkratic rationality. On this view, enkratic rationality is primarily a constitutive requirement on agency: it is a standard internal to agency, i.e., a standard that partly spells out what it is to exercise one's agential powers well.
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Keywords | rationality and reasons reasoning enkratic rationality normativity constitutivism John Broome |
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DOI | 10.1111/ejop.12172 |
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Introduction: Special Issue on Agency and Rationality.Sergio Tenenbaum & David Horst - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (4).
Rationalitätsforderungen als konstitutive Normen.Jonas Zahn - 2020 - Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie 3 (1):69-89.
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