Connectionism and the Philosophical Foundations of Cognitive Science

Metaphilosophy 28 (1-2):1-30 (1997)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This is an overview of recent philosophical discussion about connectionism and the foundations of cognitive science. Connectionist modeling in cognitive science is described. Three broad conceptions of the mind are characterized, and their comparative strengths and weaknesses are discussed: (1) the classical computation conception in cognitive science; (2) a popular foundational interpretation of connectionism that John Tienson and I call “non‐sentential computationalism”; and (3) an alternative interpretation of connectionism we call “dynamical cognition.” Also discussed are two recent philosophical attempts to enlist connectionism in defense of eliminativism about folk psychology.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1111/1467-9973.00039

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Moral Accountancy and Moral Worth.Saul Smilansky - 1997 - Metaphilosophy 28 (1‐2):123-134.
On the Poverty of Scientism, or: The Ineluctable Roughness of Rationality.Murray Code - 1997 - Metaphilosophy 28 (1-2):102-122.
On the Poverty of Scientism.Murray Code - 1997 - Metaphilosophy 28 (1):102--22.
Character-Principlism and the Particularity Objection.Jeffrey Blustein - 1997 - Metaphilosophy 28 (1-2):135-155.
Neoclassical Economics and the Last Dogma of Positivism: Is the Normative-Positive Distinction Justified?L. D. Keita - 1997 - Metaphilosophy 28 (1-2):81-101.
Directions in Connectionist Research: Tractable Computations Without Syntactically Structured Representations.Jonathan Waskan & William Bechtel - 1997 - Metaphilosophy 28 (1‐2):31-62.
Connectionism, analogicity and mental content.Gerard O'Brien - 1998 - Acta Analytica 13:111-31.
Pr cis of connectionism and the philosophy of psychology.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):337 – 356.
Connectionism isn't magic.Hugh Clapin - 1991 - Minds and Machines 1 (2):167-84.
Representation and computation in a deflationary assessment of connectionist cognitive science.Keith Butler - 1995 - Synthese 104 (1):71-97.
Connectionism, eliminativism, and the future of folk psychology.William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & J. Garon - 1991 - In William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 499-533.
Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation.Cynthia MacDonald & Graham MacDonald (eds.) - 1991 - Blackwell.
Networks with Attitudes.Paul Skokowski - 2007 - Artificial Intelligence and Society 22 (3):461-470.
Folk psychology and cognitive architecture.Frances Egan - 1995 - Philosophy of Science 62 (2):179-96.
Computation, connectionism and modelling the mind.Mary Litch - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):357-364.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
118 (#146,865)

6 months
15 (#145,565)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

The Physical Church–Turing Thesis: Modest or Bold?Gualtiero Piccinini - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (4):733-769.
Embodied cognition and linguistic comprehension.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):294-304.
What Does the Frame Problem Tell us About Moral Normativity?Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):25-51.
Kim's Supervenience Argument and the Nature of Total Realizers.Douglas Keaton - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (2):243-259.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references