Are You Now or Have You Ever Been an Impermissivist? --- A conversation among friends and enemies of epistemic freedom

In Blake Roeber, Matthias Steup, Ernest Sosa & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Wiley-Blackwell (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

We debate whether permissivism is true. We start off by assuming an accuracy-oriented framework, and then discuss metaepistemological questions about how our epistemic evaluations promote accuracy.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Chancy accuracy and imprecise credence.Jennifer Carr - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):67-81.
Reliabilism and imprecise credences.Weng Hong Tang - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1463-1480.
Atheists and Believers: Worst Friends or Best Enemies?Roger Pouivet - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (1):105--120.
Epistemic Akrasia and Belief‐Credence Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson & Peter Tan - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):717–727.
Epistemic Conservativity and Imprecise Credence.Jason Konek - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
The dispositional account of credence.Anna Mahtani - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):727-745.
On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):9-31.
Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.
Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-09-05

Downloads
701 (#24,585)

6 months
211 (#13,070)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Sinan Dogramaci
University of Texas at Austin
Sophie Horowitz
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Miriam Schoenfield
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - New York, NY.: Oxford University Press UK.
Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2004 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 66 (2):381-381.
Impermissive Bayesianism.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2013 - Erkenntnis 79 (Suppl 6):1185-1217.
A puzzle about epistemic akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.

View all 26 references / Add more references