Are You Now or Have You Ever Been an Impermissivist? --- A conversation among friends and enemies of epistemic freedom

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In Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Third Edition (forthcoming)
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Abstract

We debate whether permissivism is true. We start off by assuming an accuracy-oriented framework, and then discuss metaepistemological questions about how our epistemic evaluations promote accuracy.

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Author Profiles

Sinan Dogramaci
University of Texas at Austin
Sophie Horowitz
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Miriam Schoenfield
University of Texas at Austin

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