Synthese 101 (3):305-45 (1994)

Authors
Terry Horgan
University of Arizona
Abstract
  David Marr provided a useful framework for theorizing about cognition within classical, AI-style cognitive science, in terms of three levels of description: the levels of (i) cognitive function, (ii) algorithm and (iii) physical implementation. We generalize this framework: (i) cognitive state transitions, (ii) mathematical/functional design and (iii) physical implementation or realization. Specifying the middle, design level to be the theory of dynamical systems yields a nonclassical, alternative framework that suits (but is not committed to) connectionism. We consider how a brain's (or a network's) being a dynamical system might be the key both to its realizing various essential features of cognition — productivity, systematicity, structure-sensitive processing, syntax — and also to a non-classical solution of (frame-type) problems plaguing classical cognitive science
Keywords Cognitive Science  Epistemology  Foundationalism  Knowledge  Marr, D
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DOI 10.1007/BF01063893
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References found in this work BETA

Vision.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.

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Citations of this work BETA

Explanation in Dynamical Cognitive Science.Joel Walmsley - 2008 - Minds and Machines 18 (3):331-348.
Cognition in Context: Phenomenology, Situated Robotics and the Frame Problem.Michael Wheeler - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):323 – 349.

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