Abstract

The effects of Mill's phenomenalistic reduction on his semantics are discussed. Some comments are made regarding both J.P. Day's criticisms of Mill's views on matter and Godfrey Vesey's discussion of Mill's version of the resemblance doctrine regarding the meaning of names of sensations. ;Finally, Mill's account of syllogistic reasoning is examined. Mill rejects the class theory as giving an adequate account of the reasoning process because, in Mill's view, we do not think in extension. Mill's reasons for rejecting the traditional account of the syllogism, his rejection of the dictum de omni et nullo principle, and his own novel conception of the syllogism are considered, as well as difficulties with Mill's account. ;Mill's account of concept formation is examined and related to Sir William Hamilton's theory. The role that language plays in concept formation is discussed. In holding that logic is concerned with names and not concepts, Mill tries to separate the concerns of logic from the concerns of psychology, though, in the end, his account of logic is not wholly free of psychological elements. In connection with this discussion of general ideas and general names, some aspects of Mill's account of reasoning are presented. Mill holds that names can function as algebraic symbols and that symbolic reasoning is possible, but that there are limits to this mechanical use of language, since understanding is not possible when reduced to mere symbolic calculation. ;Mill's view of proper names is examined in light of John Searle's account, which represents a compromise between Mill and Frege. In regard to Mill's theory of propositions, it is noted that Mill does not hold any such principle as Frege's that the sense of the whole is determined by the sense of the parts. In his account of the variation in the meaning of names, Mill emphasizes a point which later gains prominence in Wittgenstein, namely that general names are often applied to new objects on the basis of a superficial resemblance and in such a fashion that the resemblance is not always in the same respect. ;Connotation is also not equivalent to implication, though Mill does on occasion use the term 'implies' for 'connotes.' Ryle has suggested that Mill's successors steered clear of his account of connotation because of its suggestion of implication. Contrary to Ryle, it is here suggested that this is probably less of a reason than that Mill's successors were more concerned to ground their metaphysics on a theory of logic. ;This dissertation is an examination of the semantics of John Stuart Mill. An account is given of Mill's theory of names and his theory of propositions, as well as a discussion of how his theory of logic and his phenomenalism relate to his theory of meaning. Gilbert Ryle wrote that Mill's successors failed to heed sufficiently his distinction between connotation and denotation. This distinction is examined in detail. It is noted that meaning cannot be identified unqualifiedly with connotation. Nor should connotation be confused with associated ideas