Two interpretations of social disrespect : a comparison between epistemic and moral recognition

In Paul Giladi & Nicola McMillan (eds.), Epistemic injustice and the philosophy of recognition. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group (2022)
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Axel Honneth
Columbia University

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