Mill on liberty

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 10 (1-4):292 – 297 (1967)
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The traditional objection to Mill's principle governing the interference of state and society in the lives of individuals is that it excludes interference only in the case of actions that harm nobody at all. Interpretations of Mill's essay which escape this objection have been suggested by J. C. Rees and Richard Wollheim. In one case Mill is said to have been concerned with harm to established interests, in the other with harm which arises by way of the beliefs of those injured. The author of the present article proposes an alternative interpretation which better represents Mill's intention and escapes objections which may be raised against the principles expounded by Rees and Wollheim. Once again, however, Mill's principle emerges as seriously flawed



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Ted Honderich
University College London

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Artificial intelligence and African conceptions of personhood.C. S. Wareham - 2021 - Ethics and Information Technology 23 (2):127-136.

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