Erkenntnis 79 (6):1419-1422 (2014)

David Hommen
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf
Within a single paragraph in his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume prompted what has become one of the most central orthodoxies in ethical theory: the thesis that one cannot derive what ought to be from what there is. In the aftermath of Hume’s seminal discussion, the No-Ought-From-Is-thesis has obtained approval among moral theorists to the point that it has been assigned the status of an undisputed ‘law’. As common with commonplaces in philosophy, alas, both the exact content and argument of ‘Hume’s Law’ have proven to be quite elusive. The present anthology aims to clarify and discuss several controversies surrounding the No-Ought-From-Is-thesis.
Keywords Hume  Is-Ought-Problem
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-014-9606-0
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Principia Ethica.George Edward Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.

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