Unifying statistically autonomous and mathematical explanations

Biology and Philosophy 36 (3):1-22 (2021)
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Abstract

A subarea of the debate over the nature of evolutionary theory addresses what the nature of the explanations yielded by evolutionary theory are. The statisticalist line is that the general principles of evolutionary theory are not only amenable to a mathematical interpretation but that they need not invoke causes to furnish explanations. Causalists object that construction of these general principles involves crucial causal assumptions. A recent view claims that some biological explanations are statistically autonomous explanations (SAEs) whereby phenomena are accounted for statistically and which prescind from micro-causal details. I raise three major problems for this account and then advance a view which unifies SAEs as mathematical explanations: the MSAE view. The MSAE view not only resolves the issues bedeviling the original SAE account but serves to importantly broaden the class of non-causal explanations in population biology.

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Travis Holmes
University of Missouri, Columbia

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