Minimalism about truth

In B. Garrett & K. Mulligan (eds.), Themes from Wittgenstein. ANU Working Papers in Philosophy 4 (1993)

Abstract

My main task here is first to distinguish, and then to map out possibilities. I won’t be concerned to argue for a certain position as much as to argue that various combinations of positions are consistent. In particular, I want to argue that a commitment to minimalism about truth does not bring an automatic commitment to what has been called a minimalist theory of truth-aptitude: the claim that every assertoric sentence which is used in a systematic way will be either true or false. Nor does minimalism about truth bring a commitment to what has been called minimalism about reference: the claim that every word used in a systematic way will refer.

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Richard Holton
Cambridge University

References found in this work

The Status of Content.Paul A. Boghossian - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (2):157-84.

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