Abstract

To isolate, analyze and explain their most basic commitments, theories of justice typically idealize. They assume for theoretical purposes, for example, that human beings possess far greater knowledge than they do, or that society's members strictly comply with just laws. Yet because it falsifies, idealization undermines the practical applicability of an ideal theory's principles. ;Although ideal theories are unsatisfactory as they stand, their fundamental principles may be invaluable in addressing our problems of justice. From such basic principles we may derive intermediate ones that bridge the gap between ideal world and real, and allow us to determine what ideal theory demands in actual circumstances. ;Going beyond others who recognize the need, but themselves offer only ideal theories, I develop a set of these intermediate principles. I examine Kant's theory of justice as a paradigm, and identify problems it cannot address because they have their source in non-ideal features, including limited knowledge, imperfect will and preexisting social injustice. I then appeal to a modified version of the perspective of the ideal citizen that Kant employs in the Rechtslehre. This modified perspective enables us to articulate principles that give effect to Kant's universal law of justice and categorical imperative in non-ideal circumstances. Illustrating its use in addressing issues such as prison reform and exclusionary zoning, I argue that augmented ideal theory can play a crucial role in our pursuit of social justice