Abstract

In political philosophy and political theory justification is an important element of normative force – of rightful pull to compliance. To justify is to address a subject in a form or with a substantive content in virtue of which the subject is supposed to be bound. Theories of justification spell out how addresses are supposed to establish subjects as rightfully bound. All arguments that purport to establish that a practice, institution, requirement or legal regime rightfully exerts a pull to compliance employ or make use of a theory of justification, and so are susceptible to challenges based in scepticism about the adequacy of that theory of justification. Theories of justification typically have epistemological and moral dimensions. The epistemological dimension of justification concerns features of the form or content of an address that generate normative force in virtue of their relationship or contribution to cognitive processes. The moral dimension of justification concerns features of the form or content of an address that generate normative force in virtue of their relationship or contribution to the requirements of morality. Both the epistemological and moral dimensions of theories of justification purport to explain what makes the form or content of an address rightfully compelling. Whether the explanation purports to explain compellingness in epistemological or moral terms, and how, precisely, the cognitive or ethical features of the address are supposed to bind is key to understanding how a specific theory of justification works.