Kant’s Invidious Humanism

Environmental Ethics 5 (1):63-70 (1983)
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Abstract

In Kant’s philosophy nonrational beings are denied moral standing. I argue that Kant's rational humanism is arbitrary and morally impoverished. In particular I show that Kant moves illegitimately from the first formulation of the categorical imperative to the second. The move to the second fonnulation relies on a new and unsupported principle introduced by Kant: rational nature and only rational nature exists as an end in itself.

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A Kantian Approach to the Moral Considerability of Non-human Nature.Toby Svoboda - 2023 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 36 (4):1-16.
Killing traditions: Consistency in applied moral philosophy.Lisa Kemmerer - 2004 - Ethics, Place and Environment 7 (3):151 – 171.

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