Reflexive monism versus complementarism: An analysis and criticism of the conceptual groundwork of Max Velmans’s reflexive model of consciousness

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):389-409 (2007)
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Abstract

From 1990 on, the London psychologist Max Velmans developed a novel approach to consciousness according to which an experience of an object is phenomenologically identical to an object as experienced. On the face of it I agree; but unlike Velmans I argue that the latter should be understood as comparable, not to a Kantian, but rather to a noematic

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Hans-Ulrich Hoche
Ruhr-Universität Bochum

Citations of this work

Reflexive monism.Max Velmans - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (2):5-50.
Wilhelm Maximilian wundt.Alan Kim - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

The Rediscovery of the Mind.John Searle - 1992 - MIT Press. Edited by Ned Block & Hilary Putnam.
Objective knowledge.Karl Raimund Popper - 1972 - Oxford,: Clarendon Press.

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