Foot Without Achilles’ Heel

Philosophia 47 (5):1501-1515 (2019)
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Abstract

It is often assumed that neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics postulates an obligation to be a good human being and that it derives further obligations from this idea. The paper argues that this assumption is false, at least for Philippa Foot’s view. Our argument blocks a widespread objection to Foot’s view, and it shows how virtue ethics in general can neutralize such worries.

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Author Profiles

Ulf Hlobil
Concordia University
Katharina Nieswandt
Concordia University

Citations of this work

Attributivism.Casey Sean Elliott - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Birmingham

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References found in this work

Natural Goodness.Philippa Foot - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).
What is a Reason to Act?Kieran Setiya - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):221-235.

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