Waging War on Pascal's Wager

Philosophical Review 112 (1):27-56 (2003)
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Abstract

Pascal’s Wager is simply too good to be true—or better, too good to be sound. There must be something wrong with Pascal’s argument that decision-theoretic reasoning shows that one must believe in God, if one is rational. No surprise, then, that critics of the argument are easily found, or that they have attacked it on many fronts. For Pascal has given them no dearth of targets.

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Citations of this work

Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.
Surreal Decisions.Eddy Keming Chen & Daniel Rubio - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):54-74.

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References found in this work

Theory of Probability.Harold Jeffreys - 1940 - Philosophy of Science 7 (2):263-264.
Probability and conditionals.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (1):64-80.
The Will to Believe.William James - 1896 - The New World 5:327--347.
Fair bets and inductive probabilities.John G. Kemeny - 1955 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 (3):263-273.

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