Freeman's Syntactic Criterion for Linkage

Informal Logic 35 (4):1-31 (2015)
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Abstract

Freeman’s syntactic criterion for linked argument structure is often readily applicable, captures intuitively linked structures, and implies that refuting a single premiss of a linked argument suffices to refute the argument. But one cannot sharply separate analysis from inference evaluation in applying it, whether an argument satisfies it can be uncertain, it under-generates cases where refuting one premiss suffices to refute an argument, some arguments satisfying it can be easily rescued if a single premiss is refuted, and Freeman’s underlying account of probative relevance is dubious.

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