Abstract

This dissertation aims at clarifying Locke's intention and achievement in the area of ethics and natural law as found in the Essay and the Two Treatises, with an emphasis on the Essay. The two works are studied as complementary in their scope and achievement. The Two Treatises fails to establish the ontological and epistemological foundation for natural law. The Essay provides that foundation. Yet although the Essay establishes criteria for a rational moral law, it fails to follow through systematically the leads provided. The Two Treatises may then be read as a completion of the work of the Essay. ;The dissertation begins with an exploration of the controversy over innate ideas as it pertains to the problem of natural law. In light of Locke's remarks that moral law must serve as a restraint of natural passion, the concepts of power, person, and happiness are explained. A careful analysis is made of his identification of natural law with the divine law. The strict conditions set for knowledge of divine law, e.g., personal immortality and the attributes of God, render a rational knowledge of natural law qua divine law impossible. ;Consideration is then given to the reasons why Locke thought it possible and desirable to demonstrate morality with the certainty of mathematics. The great gap between the promise and the performance of demonstration leads to a discussion of the various interpretations of Locke. Through a consideration of the aim and style of the Essay some guidelines for interpretation are established, in light of which it is shown that the Essay contains a new secular utilitarian morality. ;Finally, the natural law doctrine of the Two Treatises is examined and related to the Essay. The "workmanship" model is shown to be superfluous in light of the more solid foundation for natural rights in the desire for comfortable self-preservation. The "Second Treatise" is shown to be a work that provides a demonstration of morality, thereby fulfilling the deepest ethical aims of the Essay