The mark of the moral: Beyond the sentimentalist turn

Philosophical Psychology 33 (4):569-591 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In light of recent empirical data, many psychologists and philosophers have turned away from rationalism about moral judgment and embraced sentimentalism. In the process, they have rejected the classical “moral signature” as a way of distinguishing moral from conventional norms in favor of a sentimentalist approach to carving out the moral domain. In this paper, we argue that this sentimentalist turn has been made prematurely. Although we agree that the experiments reveal that the classical approach is flawed, we propose to replace it with an alternative, according to which a norm is moral precisely if it is justifiable to all. This does not hold for most norms based on disgust or loyalty to a particular community. We accommodate the fact that such norms are not merely conventional by introducing a third domain, the domain of ethics. Our proposal reveals that (psychological) rationalism is still a viable option, as a lot of the experimental evidence that features emotions concerns the domain of ethics rather than morality.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,349

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Metaethics and emotions research: A response to Prinz.Karen Jones - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):45-53.
Moral Sentimentalism.Michael Slote - 2004 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (1):3-14.
A new moral sentimentalism.Eric Vogelstein - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):346-368.
The Humean Sentimentalist Learns from the Aristotelian Anscombe.Michael Slote - 2019 - In Elisa Grimi, John Haldane, Maria Margarita Mauri Alvarez, Michael Wladika, Marco Damonte, Michael Slote, Randall Curren, Christian B. Miller, Liezl Zyl, Christopher D. Owens, Scott J. Roniger, Michele Mangini, Nancy Snow & Christopher Toner (eds.), Virtue Ethics: Retrospect and Prospect. Springer. pp. 59-66.
The Limits of Emotion in Moral Judgment.Joshua May - 2018 - In Karen Jones & François Schroeter (eds.), The Many Moral Rationalisms. New York: Oxford Univerisity Press. pp. 286-306.
What Makes a Sentiment Moral?Antti Kauppinen - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics vol. 5. Oxford University Press. pp. 225-256.
Moral Judgments as Educated Intuitions.Hanno Sauer - 2017 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Moral Philosophy and the ‘Ethical Turn’ in Anthropology.Michael Klenk - 2019 - Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie (2):1-23.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-03-11

Downloads
82 (#200,222)

6 months
18 (#135,873)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?