Michael Dummett's Logical Basis of Metaphysics
Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada) (
1997)
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Abstract
In this dissertation I argue that there are three major problems with Dummett's theory of meaning for natural language. The first problem is epistemological. Dummett invokes the concept of implicit knowledge to explain how we are able to learn and master the language that we speak. Dummett argues that the only way to avoid the negative semantic implications of Wittgenstein's say/show distinction is to explain how we are able to grasp sense. Grasping sense depends upon our implicit knowledge of the meaning of our language. Dummett's argument for avoiding Wittgenstein's say/show distinction is in the form of a disjunctive syllogism: either a theory of meaning can obtain as a theory of understanding, or a theory of sense is mute. That there are problems with the first disjunct suggests that we can infer the second and conclude that Wittgenstein is right: a theory of sense is mute. ;The second problem is contextual. The best way to interpret Dummett's philosophy of language is within the context of what Kripke describes as a tension between two tendencies: a tension between our scientific and non-scientific tendencies. The first tendency influences Dummett to conceive of philosophy as a sector in the quest for the truth, and as providing explanations for baffling problems. The second tendency influences Dummett to put a constraint upon the first tendency. Wittgenstein's later philosophy functions, for Dummett, as a reminder that such scientific theorizing about language cannot be produced apart from how language is used. What is problematic about this tension is that it influences Dummett to posit the problematic concept of implicit knowledge. ;The third problem is interpretative. Dummett's problematic theory of meaning for language is, in the end, a reductio ad absurdum of his interpretation of Wittgenstein as a full-blooded conventionalist. Through a discussion of Wittgenstein's particular brand of conventionalism, as well as his own contribution to the foundations dispute in the philosophy of mathematics, I argue that Dummett's reading of Wittgenstein is incorrect. The success of Dummett's worthwhile contribution to analytical philosophy depends upon adequately addressing these three problems