Michael Dummett's Logical Basis of Metaphysics

Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada) (1997)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this dissertation I argue that there are three major problems with Dummett's theory of meaning for natural language. The first problem is epistemological. Dummett invokes the concept of implicit knowledge to explain how we are able to learn and master the language that we speak. Dummett argues that the only way to avoid the negative semantic implications of Wittgenstein's say/show distinction is to explain how we are able to grasp sense. Grasping sense depends upon our implicit knowledge of the meaning of our language. Dummett's argument for avoiding Wittgenstein's say/show distinction is in the form of a disjunctive syllogism: either a theory of meaning can obtain as a theory of understanding, or a theory of sense is mute. That there are problems with the first disjunct suggests that we can infer the second and conclude that Wittgenstein is right: a theory of sense is mute. ;The second problem is contextual. The best way to interpret Dummett's philosophy of language is within the context of what Kripke describes as a tension between two tendencies: a tension between our scientific and non-scientific tendencies. The first tendency influences Dummett to conceive of philosophy as a sector in the quest for the truth, and as providing explanations for baffling problems. The second tendency influences Dummett to put a constraint upon the first tendency. Wittgenstein's later philosophy functions, for Dummett, as a reminder that such scientific theorizing about language cannot be produced apart from how language is used. What is problematic about this tension is that it influences Dummett to posit the problematic concept of implicit knowledge. ;The third problem is interpretative. Dummett's problematic theory of meaning for language is, in the end, a reductio ad absurdum of his interpretation of Wittgenstein as a full-blooded conventionalist. Through a discussion of Wittgenstein's particular brand of conventionalism, as well as his own contribution to the foundations dispute in the philosophy of mathematics, I argue that Dummett's reading of Wittgenstein is incorrect. The success of Dummett's worthwhile contribution to analytical philosophy depends upon adequately addressing these three problems

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,593

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Dummett's Notion of Implicit Knowledge.Cheng-Hung Tsai - 2003 - Philosophical Writings 24:17-35.
Practical knowledge of language.Cheng-Hung Tsai - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (2):331-341.
Wittgenstein and Logical Necessity.Laverne Joseph Denning - 1986 - Dissertation, University of Kansas
Discussion.Cesare Cozzo - 2011 - In Carlo Cellucci, Emily Grosholz & Emiliano Ippoliti (eds.), Logic and Knowledge. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 101-7.
Michael Dummett on the Theory of Meaning.Patricia Ann White Sayre - 1987 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
The seas of language.Michael Dummett - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Dummett's Mew Strategies of Anti-Realism.Xiao-Ming Ren & Han-Sheng Zhang - 2004 - Nankai University (Philosophy and Social Sciences) 6:43-47.
Realism and the Theory of Meaning.Louise Marie Antony - 1982 - Dissertation, Harvard University
Dummett's case for intuitionism.John P. Burgess - 1984 - History and Philosophy of Logic 5 (2):177-194.
Swimming and speaking spanish.Patricia Hanna - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (3):267-285.
Michael Dummett.Bernhard Weiss - 2002 - Princeton University Press.
The logical basis of metaphysics.Richard L. Purtill - 1995 - History of European Ideas 21 (2):297-298.
The logic of logical revision formalizing Dummett's argument.Jon Cogburn - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):15 – 32.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-02-04

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references