Harm, Sharm, and One Extremely Creepy Argument

Faith and Philosophy 21 (2):250-255 (2004)
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Abstract

In a recent essay appearing in this journal, I argued that, even on the assumption that the fetus is a person from the moment of conception, a Christian can consistently hold that while abortion is always murder, it ought to be legally permitted. On the assumption that the ultimate fate of moral innocents is eternal bliss, abortion, I argued, does not result in thesort of harm that ought to be legally prohibited under certain principles of moral legitimacy. Mark C. Murphy published a response to this essay in which he disputes my argument that abortion does not, under such an assumption, result in harm. In this brief essay, I reply to his criticism.

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Harm, Sharm, and One Extremely Creepy Argument.Kenneth Einar Himma - 2004 - Faith and Philosophy 21 (2):250-255.

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