Artificial agency, consciousness, and the criteria for moral agency: What properties must an artificial agent have to be a moral agent? [Book Review]

Ethics and Information Technology 11 (1):19-29 (2009)
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Abstract

In this essay, I describe and explain the standard accounts of agency, natural agency, artificial agency, and moral agency, as well as articulate what are widely taken to be the criteria for moral agency, supporting the contention that this is the standard account with citations from such widely used and respected professional resources as the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. I then flesh out the implications of some of these well-settled theories with respect to the prerequisites that an ICT must satisfy in order to count as a moral agent accountable for its behavior. I argue that each of the various elements of the necessary conditions for moral agency presupposes consciousness, i.e., the capacity for inner subjective experience like that of pain or, as Nagel puts it, the possession of an internal something-of-which-it is-is-to-be-like. I ultimately conclude that the issue of whether artificial moral agency is possible depends on the issue of whether it is possible for ICTs to be conscious.

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References found in this work

Artificial Evil and the Foundation of Computer Ethics.Luciano Floridi & J. W. Sanders - 2001 - Springer Netherlands. Edited by Luciano Floridi & J. W. Sanders.
Reason, relativity, and responsibility in computer ethics.James H. Moor - 1998 - Acm Sigcas Computers and Society 28 (1):14-21.
Pragmatism in Progress.Tsjalling Swierstra - 2004 - Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 7 (3):39-49.
Angels and artifacts: Moral agents in the age of computers and networks.Keith Miller & David Larson - 2005 - Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society 3 (3):151-157.

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