Authority

In Colin Aitken, Amalia Amaya, Kevin D. Ashley, Carla Bagnoli, Giorgio Bongiovanni, Bartosz Brożek, Cristiano Castelfranchi, Samuele Chilovi, Marcello Di Bello, Jaap Hage, Kenneth Einar Himma, Lewis A. Kornhauser, Emiliano Lorini, Fabrizio Macagno, Andrei Marmor, J. J. Moreso, Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, Antonino Rotolo, Giovanni Sartor, Burkhard Schafer, Chiara Valentini, Bart Verheij, Douglas Walton & Wojciech Załuski (eds.), Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation. Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer Verlag. pp. 191-217 (2011)
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Abstract

Authority is defined by the capacity to provide new reasons that apply to its subjects. There are two types of authority that differ from each other with respect to the kind of reasons their directives or opinions create. Authorityepistemic authority is distinguished from Authoritypractical authority in that the former is the source of reasons to believe and the latter is the source of reasons for action. Both kinds of authority are of considerable philosophical importance. This entry, however, is concerned with the notion of practical authority and will focus on certain conceptual and normative issues arising in connection with such authority. In particular, this entry will be concerned with identifying the properties that constitute something as a practical authority and hence distinguish authorities from non-authorities; explicating the kind of reasons that bind subjects of a practical authority and give rise to a justified expectation, on the part of the authority, of subject compliance; and examining what standards a practical authority must satisfy to be morally legitimate. The reason for the emphasis is the central importance of practical authority in law. Law characteristically regulates subject behavior by issuing legal norms thought to be authoritative in the sense that they create new reasons for compliance that bind the subject. While the notion of epistemic authority figures into many issues arising in connection with law, this entry is intended to clarify the notion of practical authority that is thought to ground the binding quality of legal directives. Although there will be some discussion of epistemic authority and its relation to practical Authoritypractical, the relevant form of authority for our purposes is practical authority—again, as this is central to understanding the mechanisms by which law regulates subject behavior.

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