Erkenntnis 86 (6):1391-1410 (2021)

Authors
Christopher Hill
Brown University
Abstract
There are two main accounts of what it is for external objects to be presented in visual experience. According to particularism, particular objects are built into the representational contents of experiences. Existentialism is a quite different view. According to existentialism, the representational contents of perceptual experiences are general rather than particular, in the sense that the contents can be fully captured by existentially quantified statements. The present paper is a defense of existentialism. It argues that existentialism is much better equipped than particularism to explain the contents of hallucinations, and it defends existentialism against three objections.
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-019-00160-z
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References found in this work BETA

Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
The Origin of Concepts.Susan Carey - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
Representation in Cognitive Science.Nicholas Shea - 2018 - Oxford University Press.

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