Le problème dynamique de l’induction

Dialogue 48 (4):701 (2009)
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Abstract

RÉSUMÉ : Depuis l’ouvrage classique de Goodman, on sait que toute théorie de l’induction doit comporter une composante non formelle. Or, la liberté théorique offerte par le recours à un tel élément implique des responsabilités. Cet article propose comme desideratum d’une théorie de l’induction qu’elle rende compte de la dynamique de sa composante non formelle. Ce desideratum, qui est nouveau, n’est pas satisfait par les principales théories existantes de l’induction. L’identification de l’importance de la dynamique a pourtant l’avantage de suggérer une voie vers une théorie plus acceptable et plus compléte de l’induction. ABSTRACT: Since Goodman’s classic monograph, it has been known that any reasonable theory of induction must involve non formal elements. However, the right to make theoretical use of such an element comes with responsibilities. This article argues for an apparently new desideratum for a theory of induction: namely, that it accounts for the dynamics of the non formal element used. None of the main existing theories of induction satisfies this desideratum. The recognition of the importance of dynamics does however have the advantage of suggesting where to look for a more acceptable and complete theory of induction

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References found in this work

Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1965 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.
Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach.Peter Urbach & Colin Howson - 1993 - Chicago: Open Court. Edited by Peter Urbach.
Theory and Evidence.Clark N. Glymour - 1980 - Princeton University Press.

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