Abstract

Human dignity is an indispensable basic value for a secular constitutional understanding. It is, however, a principle needing and capable of much translation, which is clearly shown by the arguments concerning gene technology and other modern technology. If human dignity is to be held away from political discussion, and thus its general acceptance secured, then a narrow understanding of Art. 1 I GG is appropriate. The often thoughtlessly used topos of "instrumentalisation-ban" is therefore not suitable. The essence of human dignity consists, according to the conception developed here, rather in the recognition of an inalienable self-worth of every single human. This intrinsic value can be described by subjective rights to a material minimum livelihood, autonomous self-development, freedom from pain, protection of the private sphere, mental-moral integrity, fundamental equality before the law and a minimum of respect. If these are taken as the measure then neither gene technology nor other modern technology as such present a violation of human dignity