A Note On Impossibility Theorems and Seniority Rules

Theory and Decision 57 (1):69-78 (2004)
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Abstract

We characterize seniority rules, also known as lexical dictatorships, under weak consistency constraints on the group’s choice function. These constraints are base triple-acyclicity in the case of binary choices and rationalizability (although not rationality) in the case of choices between an arbitrary number of alternatives. Existing results on these weakened constraints remain silent on the treatment of the group’s most junior individuals and therefore do not yield a complete characterization of seniority rules. We also impose a universal domain, binary strict Pareto optimality, binary Pareto indifference, binary independence of irrelevant alternatives, and the newly introduced condition of conflict resolution. The latter condition requires a social choice rules not to remain indecisive between alternatives for which individuals have conflicting preferences

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References found in this work

Social Choice and Individual Values.Irving M. Copi - 1952 - Science and Society 16 (2):181-181.
Social Choice and Individual Values.Kenneth Joseph Arrow - 1951 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley: New York.
Internal consistency of choice.Amartya Sen - 1993 - Econometrica 61:495–521.
Interpersonal comparisons of well-being.Jon Elster & John E. Roemer (eds.) - 1991 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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